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Abstract
It is a well known fact that many dynamic games are subject to the curse of dimen-
sionality, limiting the ability to use them in the study of real-world problems. I propose a
new method to solve complex large-scale dynamic games using aggregation as an approx-
imate solution. I obtain two fundamental characterization results. First, approximations
with small within-state variation in the primitives have a smaller maximum error bound.
I provide numerical results which compare the exact errors and the bound. Second, I nd
that for monotone games, order preserving aggregation is a necessary condition of any
optimal aggregation. I suggest using quantiles as a straightforward implementation of
an order preserving aggregation architecture for industry distributions. I conclude with an
illustration, by solving and estimating a stylized dynamic reputation game for the hotel
industry. Simulation results show maximal errors between the exact and approximated
solutions below 6%, with average errors below 1%.
Keywords: Aggregation, Curse of Dimensionality, Dynamic Games, Reputation, Markov
Perfect Equilibrium.
1 Introduction
The largest challenge to studying discrete state dynamic games is the curse of dimensionality.
The curse of dimensionality occurs because the number of states grows exponentially with the
number of players. If there are N players, and each can be in one of K possible states, the size
of the problem is KN .
However, studying dynamic interactions is relevant for marketing scholars given the impor-
tance of persistence that naturally generates models of dynamic demand (see Nair, 2019 for a
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review). For example, Che, Sudhir and Seetharaman (2007) nd that "omission of state depen-
dence in demand biases inference of rm behavior" while Dubé, Hitsch and Rossi (2010) "show
that the nding of inertia is robust to exible controls for preference heterogeneity and not due
to autocorrelated taste shocks". Several authors address this dynamic element and study set-
tings with dynamic competition. Shen (2014) constructs a dynamic model with endogenously
expanding demand to investigate the optimal entry and exit behavior of rms. Dubé, Hitsch
and Manchanda (2005) use a dynamic advertising competition model to show that pulsing (on
and o¤) is an optimal (equilibrium) advertising strategy. Goettler and Gordon (2011, 2014) use
a dynamic oligopoly framework to explain how competition can reduce innovation in an environ-
ment with persistent demand. This area is now growing but researchers face some limitations.
For example, Chintagunta, Qin and Vitorino (2018) acknowledge this limitation because the
"dynamic problem specied (...) is computationally infeasible due to the very large size of the
state space, and the need to solve for equilibrium prices in an oligopoly setting" forcing them
to "simplify the rms optimization problem by focusing on the intertemporal pricing consider-
ations". The same problem of large state spaces is acknowledged by Nair (2019): "A separate
area where more progress will be welcome is in developing methods to handle very large state
spaces in the context of dynamic games.".
To alleviate the curse of dimensionality problem, I propose an approximation method using
state aggregation. Let N be the number of competitors and K the number of possible states
for each competitor (e.g. state 1; 2; :::; K). The proposed method allows researchers to study
more complex environments with more competitors and larger state spaces. The base idea is
intuitive, in a game that satises symmetry and anonymity, only the state of the competitors
matters and not their identity (Doraszelski and Satterthwaite, 2010). That is, a situation with
competitor A in state 1 and competitor B in state 2 is identical to a situation with competitor
A in state 2 and competitor B in state 1 (identical state). This means that the industry state
(market structure) is fully summarized by the distribution of players across the states. The
benet is that instead of growing exponentially, the number of possible states is now growing at
a much smaller rate.1 For example, a problem with K = 5 possible states and 100 players has
7:9 1069 industry states in the base case that can be reduced to 2:2 107 possible distribution
congurations.2 Taking this idea one step further we can now aggregate states that are close in
a distribution sense, that is, quantiles. For example, the industry distribution with K = 5 has
350 possible states (approximated by 5 quantiles) and 3; 575 possible states (approximated by 10
quantiles). The di¤erence from aggregation of "single agent" problems to games is that besides
the approximation error to the single agent dynamic problem, there is a second approximation
error to the rivals equilibrium strategies. That is because we can only solve for approximated
equilibrium strategies.
To illustrate the idea, consider the example in Table [1] with three rms competing against
rm i and one variable that can take only two values, High (H) or Low (L). The original
problem has 8 (23) possible industry congurations for the rivals state. The symmetric and






2Table [2] in Section [3] reports how the size of the state space varies with the numbers of rms.
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. Industry states 2, 3 and 5 get aggregated into
state B whereas industry states 4, 6 and 7 get aggregated into state C. The solution obtained
is exactly the same because the problem in state (L;L;H) is the same as in state (L;H;L)
or state (H;L; L). That is, the three states are identical. If we call this "macro-state" (2; 1)
denoting 2 competitors in L state and 1 competitor in H state we can say that this macro-state
has zero within-state variation, where the variation is dened with respect to the equilibrium
value function. That is, the equilibrium value at each of the states is the same and there is
no information lost from aggregating them.3 The four resulting aggregate states can be further
aggregated into only two macro-states E and F where E contains the previously dened states
A and B whereas F contains the previously dened states C and D (see Table [1]). This now
extends to aggregation of non-identical and there is some information lost, since the equilbrium
value at the aggregated states is no longer the same. On the other hand, the benet is that
the number of states at which we need to solve the model is smaller. This is the trade-o¤ of
aggregation, obtaining the largest state space that is computationally feasible with the smallest
loss of information possible.
Table 1: Aggregation Example.
Industry Firm Symmetric Aggregated
State 1 2 3 Anonymous Industry
Industry State State
1 L L L A E
2 L L H B E
3 L H L B E
4 L H H C F
5 H L L B E
6 H L H C F
7 H H L C F
8 H H H D F
I obtain two main results on the quality of approximate aggregation methods. First, Theorem
[5.1] characterizes the sup-norm error for a general class of aggregation methods. It illustrates
the three sources of error. In particular, it shows that approximate solutions with a smaller
within-state variation in both primitives (i) the period returns and (ii) transition matrix, are
characterized by a smaller sup-norm error. The third source of error is specic to games and
is not present in single agent problems. It is due to the use of approximate, instead of the
exact solution, to the rivalsstrategies. Second, Theorem [6.2] provides a necessary condition of
an optimal aggregation scheme. When the value function satises a state ordering property
(monotonicity), an optimal aggregation must respect an order preserving condition.4 This is a
necessary condition. There can be multiple aggregation rules that satisfy this condition. It is
a rather intuitive result given that previous research already emphasizes that "similar" states
3If the problem is not truly symmetric and anonymous, the simplied aggregation comes at the cost of some loss
of information. There is information loss from aggregation because the within-state variation is strictly positive
(di¤erent values at di¤erent states). The information loss grows with the growth of within-state variation. See
Geiger and Temmel (2014) for a discussion on lumping of Markov chains and the information loss (entropy).
4Section [6] contains the exact denitions of monotonicity and order preserving aggregation.
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should be aggregated together (Bertsekas and Castanon, 1989). Given that, in our case, an
industry state (market structure) is a distribution, two states are "similar" if the two industry
distributions are close in some appropriate metric (the exact metric is unimportant for our
results). For example, in Table [1] we decided to aggregate A and B into state E, instead of
aggregating A and C. This is intuitive. State A has 3 rms in low state. State C has two rms
in high state and one rm in low state while state B has two rms in low state and one rm in
high state. Thus, state A is "closer" to state B than to state C and this is why we propose to
aggregate them. This illustrates the result that optimal aggregation must be order preserving.
Of course we could also aggregate A, B and C (or B and C) thus preserving the order but we
should not aggregate A and C without B.
Aggregating states with similar market structures reduces within aggregate state variation.
It reduces the variability of micro-states within a given macro-state, that characterized the error
obtained in Theorem [5.1]. This result is important as it let us explain which approximation
schemes are not optimal. From a pratical perspective, if the researcher cannot solve the game
at all possibly industry states, she can try and solve the game at the aggregate points dened
by industry distribution quantiles. The result tells us that whatever is the optimal aggregation
rule, it belongs to the same class as the selected quantiles (necessary condition).
I conclude with an illustration by solving, and estimating, a stylized dynamic reputation
game for the hotel industry. The game is subject to the curse of dimensionality, that makes
it a computational challenge to solve when there is more than about a dozen players. I use
a least squares nested xed point approach for estimation. Although nested xed point is
econometrically more e¢ cient than two-step methods (e.g. Bajari, Benkard and Levin, 2007),
and not subject to the potential identication problems created by the choice (perturbation)
of alternative actions (Srisuma, 2013), they are often neglected in dynamic games due to the
computational challenge of solving the game multiple times. I illustrate how the nested xed
point can be applied using the method developed in this article. Using it we are able to solve
the game in about 460 seconds.
2 Related Literature
The method of aggregation is frequent in numerical solutions for large scale dynamic program-
ming problems (e.g. Bertsekas, 2005; Van Roy, 2006). The aggregation method developed here
is su¢ ciently general to be applied to any type of Markov games. Hard aggregation consists of
assigning micro states to macro (or aggregate) states where the assignment is many to one, that
is, many micro states are aggregated into one macro state.5 For a given number of aggregate
nodes/states, the main decision is about which micro-states to aggregate together. The main
advantage of aggregation is the reduction in the number states. In discrete state Markov games,
obtaining an equilibrium solution is constrained by the curse of dimensionalitycaused by the
exponential growth of the state space as either (i) the number of players (N) or (ii) the number
5In hard aggregation each micro state is assigned to only one aggregate/macro state while in soft aggregation,
micro states can be assigned to more than one aggregate/macro state.
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of state variables (K) increase. For example, in our application the set of industry states with
77 players and a state variable that takes 5 levels, has cardinality equal to 6:6  1053. Using
aggregation, the industry state is reduced from 6:6  1053 to 630.6
The problem with aggregation is that it works as an approximation. As such, the solution to
the aggregated problem di¤ers from the solution to the original problem. We thus need to nd
an aggregation solution that is optimal in some sense. For example, an aggregation is optimal
if it delivers the smallest approximation error for a given size of the industry state (a number
of macro states). The selection of an aggregation rule (matrix) is what determines the quality
of the approximation. This is not a trivial decision because the literature on general optimal
aggregation rules is scarce, even for simple Markov chains. For example, Deng et al. (2011)
discuss optimality for simple discrete time Markov chains and show that numerically searching
for the optimal aggregation is a problem itself subject to the curse of dimensionality (see their
Equation [8]).
I borrow ideas from two articles: order preserving aggregation and state similarity. First, Jia
(2011) shows that consecutive (order preserving) state aggregation is optimal for the case where
the value function is a priori known. Second, Deng et al. (2011) show that for irreducible and
aperiodic Markov chains, partitioning the chain according to the sign structure of the eigenvector
for the second largest eigenvalue allows maximal information extraction for a given partition size.
This partitioning rule aggregates highly communicating states (states with high within macro-
state transition). However, this result can only be shown for the case with two macro-states
(bi-partition). In Section [6] I extend these results by restricting to symmetric and anonymous
monotone Markov games. For this class of games I show that a necessary condition of an optimal
aggregation mechanism is order preservation. I show that one straigthforward way to implement
order preserving aggregation for symmetric and anonymous monotone Markov games which is
the use of quantiles. However, the order preserving aggregation can take many other forms.
Several methods have been proposed to address the curse of dimensionality in discrete state
Markovian games. For example, Pakes and Mcguire (2001) suggest the use of a stochastic algo-
rithm that wanders through the state space and updates states in the recurrent class, avoiding
the computation of the integral for all the states in the state space. The computational gains are
larger when the recurrent class of the state space is signicantly smaller than the full state space.
This algorithm is mostly t for cases where the ergodic set has low cardinality. Weintraub et al.
(2008) propose an alternative equilibrium concept, the oblivious equilibrium. In the oblivious
equilibrium, playersstrategies depend solely on own state and long run state distribution, that
is, all rivalsstates (s i) are aggregated into one single macro-node (the LR industry distribu-
tion). This framework is a good approximation for industries with a large number of rms and
no aggregate shocks, provided the industry distribution satises a light tail condition (no market
leaders).7
Ifrach and Weintraub (2016) extend this and propose a moment-based Markov equilibrium
6Note that the assumptions of symmetry and anonymity already reduce the size of the state (industry distri-
bution) to 7:9 million.
7The oblivious equilibrium concept proposed by Weintraub et al. (2008) requires a "light tail" condition for
the equilibrium state distribution to have a well dened steady state distribution.
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(MME) with dominant rms, where each rm keeps track of the states of the dominant rms
and a few moments for the fringe rms. It departs from the Oblivious Equilibrium proposed
by Weintraub, Benkard and Van Roy (2008) by including the dominant rmss state and the
moments for the fringe rms. Both the Oblivious and the MME equilibrium concepts can be
analyzed as aggregation architectures. Take the MME approach, which is more general. The
aggregation rule is as follows: two micro-states with the same individual states for the dominant
rms and the same moment for the fringe rms, are aggregated in the same macro-node. For
example, imagine a case with 9 rival rms where each rm is dominant if they reach state 5 and
let F be the cumulative distribution over the non-dominant states (1 to 4). Under the moment-
based approximation, facing a distribution over states 1 to 4 of F = (:3; :6; :9; :9) is similar to
facing a distribution of F = (:2; :7; :9; :9); since the average of the 9 non dominant rms is 2 in
both cases. Moment-based aggregation would thus aggregate these two states together. While
an MME can be written using state aggregation, moments fall outside of the optimal class of
aggregations because the MME does not satisfy the monotonicity condition that is the necessary
condition for aggregation to be optimal. As we show in our application to the hotel industry,
the equilibrium distribution is multimodal making it impossible to use either the oblivious or
the MME equilibrium concepts.
Farias, Saure and Weintraub (2012) propose a fully separable approximation architecture and
also illustrate that MME is underperforming when compared to the new approximate solution.
They extend to dynamic games the work of De Farias and Van Roy (2003) on single agent
problems which consists of using a linear programming approach to solve an approximated value
function. The value function is approximated by basis functions, transforming the game into a
much more tractable linear programming problem. They have two main contributions.
First, a mathematical programming approach to computing dynamic games that involves
solving a linear program subject to non-linear constraints. This is di¤erent from the traditional
approaches to solving Markov decision problems such as the one used here. Perhaps the main
disadvantage of the linear programming method for solving MDPs is that it requires setting up
the set of non linear constraints, one for each industry state. This is still subject to the curse of
dimensionality (see their equation [4]), and is overcome by using constraint sampling. Second,
the use of basis functions as an approximation to solve large scale problems. Basis functions,
as well as aggregation, are part of the more general class of approximations that use lower
dimensional basis to approximate higher dimensional objects. Their matrix  is a mapping
from the number of states to the number of nodes/basis functions. In particular, their most
accurate approximation method is the fully separable approximation architecture. It resembles
aggregation as it involves a  matrix of zeros and ones. The di¤erence is that each "macro-state"
maps to more than one micro-state. Another important di¤erence between hard aggregation and
basis functions is that no disaggregation matrix is explicitly specied. This article also departs
from theirs by exploiting information on the primitives to characterize optimality. In fact,
the optimal choice of aggregate nodes can be combined with the linear programming method
proposed by Farias et al. (2012). Furthermore, we provide theoretical foundations for why
moments-based approximations underperform when compared to basis function approximations.
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Something to which we return below.
3 Model
This section describes the elements of the model. In particular, I describe the period game, the
transition function, the payo¤s, the strategies, and the equilibrium concept. Unless otherwise
stated, all proofs contained in the article are original. In what follows, boldface denotes vectors
(e.g. s, V) while sets are denoted with an overtilde (e.g. ~S; ~A; ~F ;...). To illustrate how the
aggregation method can be implemented, I use a stylized model of reputation building in the
hotel industry.
I consider a dynamic game with discrete time t = 1; 2; :::;1.8 The number of players is N
and is assumed xed over time and a typical player is denoted by i 2 f1; ::; Ng. Players can
choose actions ait 2 ~A, for example, agents can decide to invest into reputation building. I will
focus on stationary Markov games, so we dont need to keep track of time and I will frequently
use the following short notation, s0 = st+1.
A variety of problems have been studied with a similar structure. For example, capacity
(investment) games (Besanko et al., 2010), innovation adoption (Schmidt-Dengler, 2006), inter-
national trade (Santos, 2017).
3.1 States, actions and state transition
States Each player is endowed with an own state variable, sit 2 ~S = f1; 2; :::; Kg -
e.g. the current rating of the hotel. The own state variable can be univariate or multivariate.
Multivariate variables can be indexed along a single dimension. The industry state can be
written as a vector, st = (s1t; :::; sNt) 2 ~SN .
Actions Actions are chosen from the set ait 2 ~Ai , where ~Ai is a compact and convex
subset of the Euclidean space and at = (a1t; :::aNt) 2 ~A = Ni=1 ~Ai - e.g. hotels choose a level
of (investment/e¤ort) into customer satisfaction. Compactness and convexity can be relaxed
given the nite nature of the state space. For simplicity, we will further assume that the set
of admissible actions is state invariant: ~Ai is the same for all s. All players choose actions
simultaneously after observing the state st.
State transition The industry state transition is described by a probability function
q : ~SN  ~SN  ~AN ! [0; 1] where a typical element q(st+1; st; at) equals the probability that
industry state st+1 is reached from state st when players choose actions at. It is required thatP
st+12 ~SN q(st+1; st; at) = 1.
8Kim, Bradlow and Iyengar (2019) show that when choosing the period of analysis (e.g. year, quarter, month)
to analyze Marketing problems, incorrect time aggregation creates either bias or variance for estimation. We are
assuming the frequency of the True Generation Process is known.
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Information structure Assume the industry state is publicly observed - all players observe
s. To guarantee existence of equilibrium (Doraszelski and Satterthwaite, 2010) let there be a
privately observed i.i.d. shock, g 2 R; with distribution G(g) and nite absolute rst moment
E(jgj) <1.9
3.2 Pay-o¤s
Period pay-o¤ Player is pay-o¤s depend on the demand, cost and pricing structure. In
reduced form, this is a function of states and actions of all players and a privately observed state
- (a; s; g) with  : ~AN  ~SN  R ! R. For simplicity, let us restrict rivalsactions to have no
direct e¤ects on period payo¤s: (a; s; g) = (a; s; g). This simplication can be relaxed but is
usefull since it allows us to separate the solution to optimal period prots (static) and focus our
attention in the solution to the dynamic decision problem (dynamic/investment). In terms of our
main results, the simplication has no e¤ect to the optimal aggregation architecture (Theorem
[6.2]). There is a minor e¤ect to the bounds derived in Theorem [5.1] that must now include an
extra term to account for the e¤ect of the departure from rivals equilibrium strategies to the
static returns.
Game pay-o¤ Players discount the future at rate  2 [0; 1) and the game pay-o¤ of player
i is equal to the present discounted value of all future period payo¤s. If rm i observes the
industry state (s) and private shock (gi), its ex-post value function can be written as
Vi(s;gi) = max
ai2 ~A




0)q(s0; s; ai;a i); 8i; s
where q(s0; s; ai;a i) is the evolution of the industry state conditional on player i choosing




0) is the ex-ante value function
V ei (s) =
Z 0@max
ai2 ~A





1A dG(g); 8i; s:
Conditional on the actions, privately observed i.i.d. shocks have no information content for
the future of the game, and the problem is similar to the case without privately observed i.i.d.
shocks. In this case, the period returns are (ai; s) and the value function is simply
Vi(s) = max
ai2 ~A




0)q(s0; s; ai;a i); 8i; s:
Although we use the case with privately observed shocks in the empirical application, we will
now assume no private information for simplicity.
9While we assume latter that persistent states are observed by the researcher(econometrician), Gallant et al.
(2017) study an enviroment where this is relaxed and persistent states can be unobservable to the researcher.
Note that, like here, in their case all states are still observed by all players.
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3.3 Strategies and equilibrium
Strategies Players use pure Markovian strategies, mapping the set of pay-o¤relevant states
onto the action set i(s) : ~SN ! ~Ai.
Equilibrium The equilibrium concept is Markov Perfect Equilibrium in the sense of Maskin
and Tirole (1988, 2001). As the focus of this article is on approximation methods, I will abstract
from problems related with existence that have been studied in the literature, and assume that
the conditions for equilibrium existence are veried. For example, Doraszelski and Satterthwaite
(2010) or Schmidt-Dengler and Pesendorfer (2008) provide existence proofs for a similar class of
models.
Denition 1 (Equilibrium) A collection of strategies (i (s)) form an equilibrium if for any
i and s
i (s) = argmax
ai2 ~A
(ai; s) + EVi(s




0)q(s0; s; ai; i) and the value function Vi (s0) satises
Vi(s) = max
ai2 ~A




0)q(s0; s; ai; i); 8i; s; (2)
where  i = (1(s); ::; i 1(s); i+1(s); ::; N(s)) is the vector of rivalsstrategies.
An equilibrium is the solution to the non-linear system of equations formed by Equations 1
and 2 (one for each i; s). In general, we might have several solutions/multiple equilibria. Optimal
strategies () generate an equilibrium industry state transition











The equilibrium solution is thus a vector of value functions (V i (s)) and optimal strategies
(i (s)) for each rm i at each industry state s. In the case of multiple equilibria there is more
than one solution to the system of equations of optimal strategies/value functions, one for each
equilibrium.
3.4 Dimensionality concerns
The problem is computationally demanding as it requires the numerical solution to a dynamic
programming problem with cardinality KN .10 One possible solution to the curse of dimensional-
ity is to impose restrictions on the primitives, (ait; s) and q(s0; s;). Anonymity and symmetry
allow the problem to be formulated in a smaller set of industry states (Ericson and Pakes, 1995;
Doraszelski and Satterthwaite, 2010). Anonymous sequential games have a long tradition in the
literature (e.g. Jovanovic and Rosenthal, 1988). Anonymity implies that rm i does not care
10There are two sources of computational complexity for dynamic problems, the size of the state space and
integration (computing the expectation). Using hard aggregation addresses the rst problem while the second
can be addressed with randomization (Rust, 1996, 1997).
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about the identity of its competitors, and its decision depends solely on the industry structure
(distribution) it faces, or
Vi(s1; :::; si; :::sj = x; :::; sl = y; :::sN) = (Anonymity)
Vi(s1; :::; si; :::sj = y; :::; sl = x; :::sN) 8 j; l 6= i;
and the value of the rm is the same for any two industry states with identical distribution.
Players are not atomistic.11
Under symmetry, the problem of a rmwith own state si and rivalsstate s i = (s1; ::; si 1; si+1; sN)
is independent of the rm i itself and solely dependent on the two states. Firms are symmetric
when all heterogeneity is included in the state vector (si; s i), or
Vj(sj; s i) = Vi(si; s i) = V (si; s i) if si = sj: (Symmetry)
Symmetry allows us to focus on the problem of solely one rm. Proposition 2 in Doraszelski and
Satterthwaite (2010), provides su¢ cient conditions on the primitives, namely, that both period
returns and the transition function are symmetric and anonymous. In this case, restricting to
symmetric strategies, the value function inherits the two properties.
Identical states We say that two states are identical if the primitives are the same at
each of those states, or s i(k) and s i(j) are identical if (si; s i(j); a) = (si; s i(k); a) and
q(s0i; s
0




 i; si; s i(k);) for any a and any  i. Two identical states can
be aggregated without information loss, and the solutions to the original and the aggregated
problems is the same. Symmetry and anonymity implies that symmetric and anonymous states
are identical.
Under symmetry and anonymity we can redene the domain of the industry state. Let
nk =
P
j 6=i 1(sj = k) be the count of rms at each possible value sj = k, k = 1; :::; K. Let F be
the cumulative relative frequency of rms at each state k = 1; :::; K   1. We can ignore the last
(Kth) element because the cumulative fraction of rms in the highest state (K) is always equal




N 1 ) maps each particular rivalsstate,
s i, into a probability space, where F : ~SN 1 ! ~F  f0; 1N 1 ; :::;
N 2
N 1 ; 1g
K 1 and N is the total
number of players including player i (N   1 is the number of rivals).12 As an example, imagine
the simplest case with two rivals and two possible states (N   1 = 2 and K = 2). The industry
distribution (cumulative frequency) can take the following values:
11In the atomistic case and in the absence of aggregate uncertainty, the industry state distribution becomes
deterministic, producing a perfect foresight equilibrium (Jovanovic and Rosenthal, 1988).
12The mass of players is constant at N . If the mass of incumbents evolves over time (as in exit/entry games)
we can let k = 0; 1; :::;K where k = 0 now denotes the mass of potential entrants and
PK
k=1 nk the mass of
incumbents.
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(n1; n2)=2
(1; 1) if both players are in state 1
(0:5; 1) if player 1 in state 1 and player 2 in state 2
(0:5; 1) if player 1 in state 2 and player 2 in state 1
(0; 1) if both players are in state 2
The subscript is used to emphasize that the F states are "linked" to s i, that is, it assigns
(rivals) micro-states (s i) to macro-state (F), with F being the cumulative relative frequency
of the number of competitors at each state f1; 2; :::; K   1g.13 The redened industry state is
(si;Fs i) 2 ~S  ~F , where the cardinality of ~F is now the combination of possible cumulative
frequency combinations (combinations of N   1 from each of the K +N   2 possibilities) which
gives the binomial coe¢ cient
j ~F j =





In the case presented above, N   1 = 2 (N   1 is the number of rival players) and K = 2 so that






The value function and strategies can be written as
V (si; s i) = VF (si;Fs i), and 
(si; s i) = 

F (si;Fs i)
where the subscript F emphasizes the new domain of the functions. These equalities are only
true when V (si; s0 i) = V (si; s
00




 i such that Fs0 i = Fs00 i. In the
example above, Fs0 i = (0:5; 1) when either s i = (1; 2), or s i = (2; 1). That is, the industry
distribution is the same in the two industry states.
The symmetric and anonymous game successfully becomes tractable. The cardinality of the





(F 2 ~F ). Note that intractable is a
problem that grows exponentially. Unfortunately, a problem that is tractable might still not be
computationally feasible to solve. Table [2] reports state size comparisons for K = 5.14
4 Hard Aggregation Methods
We start this section by rst dening hard aggregation. Let V be a j ~SjNx1 vector,  be a
j ~SjNxj ~Sjj ~P j matrix, and r a j ~Sjj ~P jx1 vector. The dimensions of the objects are the number of
possible industry states (j ~SjN) and the number of approximated states (j ~Sjj ~P j). In the approxi-
mated case we always keep track of the individual state and that is why we use (j ~Sjj ~P j) instead of
13Note that F is dened over the vector space ~SN 1 and not solely over the scalar space ~S: So, F is not a
probability measure because F is (i) a vector and (ii) cannot add up to 1. Alternatively, we could dene a proper
cumulative probability function F̂s i that assigns to each s 2 ~S a probability on the set f0; 1N 1 ; :::;
N 2
N 1 ; 1g and
our previous function can be dened as Fs i = (F̂s i(1); :::; F̂s i(K   1)), where
PK
k=1 F̂s i (k) = 1 and F̂ is a
proper probability measure. The reason not to write the state this way is to make clear that s is not a random
variable. The random variable here is the rivalsstate, that is, the whole vector s i (as well as Fs i).
14Although symmetry and anonymity successfully break the curse of dimensionality, it does not make problems
computationally feasible because they are still too large to be solved. For example, the size of the state space
with 100 rms is reduced from 7:9 1069 to 2:2 107.
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Table 2: Dimensionality of the industry state space for di¤erent number of rms with and


















(j ~P j) as this way we emphasize that the approximated case is solved at each of the j ~Sj individual
states. Aggregation is part of a more general class of approximation architectures where the
vector V in high dimension is approximated by r where r is of much smaller dimensionality
than V. In this sense we try to nd a lower dimensional space span that approximates reason-
ably well the higher dimensional space. The basis functions proposed by Farias et al. (2012) is
part of the same class of approximation architectures. Aggregation is su¢ ciently general and
can be applied to any type of Markov decision problem (see Van Roy, 2006). This incorporates
both perfect and imperfect information Markov games (hidden Markov model when strategies
are restricted to be Markov). For this section we will separate the own state (si) from the rivals
vector of states (s i) and perform the aggregation over the rivalsstate. The analysis is thus
"conditional" on si.
Aggregation An aggregation can be described by two matrices: the aggregation matrix
(the rule allocating micro states to macro states), and the disaggregation matrix (the rule split-
ting macro states into micro states). Take our main object of interest, the value function
V (si; s i) , and let V = V (:; :) be the vector containing all the values V for each rm i, stacked
over each possible state (si; s i). All possible (si; s i) states are indexed along a single dimen-
sion. An aggregation, maps the vector V to another vector VP at each alternative macro-state
(si; P ) 2 ~S  ~P where ~P is the set of possible macro-states, and j ~P j << j ~SjN 1. Let V be
the j ~SjNx1 vector and  be a j ~SjNxj ~Sjj ~P j (binary) aggregation matrix where there is a "1"
in entry (j; k) when micro-state (si; s i(j)) is aggregated in macro-state (si; Ps i(k)), and a "0"
otherwise. Again, the subscript is used to emphasize that the aggregation matrix links each s i
to each P . This (hard aggregation) matrix satises some properties: each row adds up to one,
it is a binary matrix, each row contains only one element di¤erent from zero, and it has (full
column) rank j ~Sjj ~P j.
12
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For example, the case reported in Table [1] corresponds to the following aggregation matrices:
̂1 =
266664
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0





1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
#T
The di¤erence between hard and soft aggregation is the restriction to mutually exclusive subsets.
Soft aggregation schemes allow micro-states to belong to more than one macro-state, which is
similar to basis function approximation. In this case, the rows of  add up to 1 but can have
more than one element di¤erent from zero.
Ideally, we would like to nd an aggregation matrix which would allow us to "recover" the
original value function
V = VP :
Unless j ~P j = j ~SjN 1 (no dimension reduction), this equality cannot hold with hard aggre-
gation (see below), except for the case where all the aggregated states are identical and have
the same value, V (zero within macro-state variation). Also, the original function belongs in
the space spanned by the columns of . It is thus important that  does not include linearly
dependent columns (full rank). As long as the aggregation matrix, , is full rank and its columns
form a basis (linear independence), soft or hard aggregation will span the same vector space,
Rj ~Sjj ~P j.
Denition 2 (Hard Aggregation) Let ~SN be the discrete set of industry states. An aggre-
gation matrix,  maps any function with domain ~SN to another function with domain ~S  ~P ,
where ~P is the set of macro-states. An aggregation scheme is hard if the implied mapping, 
is surjective, that is, every element in ~SN maps to only one element in ~S  ~P (each row of 
contains one and only one 1 and the matrix is full column rank).
Disaggregation Paired with the aggregation matrix, there is a disaggregation ma-
trix. It reassigns each macro-state to the micro-states. Let DT be a j ~SjNxj ~Sjj ~P j disaggregation
matrix (where T denotes the matrix transpose) . We can write
VP = DV;
and obtain a smaller vector VP out of the original vector V. The disaggregation matrix satises
the following properties: its columns add up to one, each element belongs to the unit interval,
and each row contains only one element di¤erent from zero. It is similar to the probability of
being in a given rivals state (s i) conditional on observing the macro-state (P ).
As disaggregation matrices we select the generalized inverses of . That is, matrices D such
that D = , where D is an orthogonal projection (D = (T) 1T ). In general, there is
an innity of generalized inverse matrices of . The three most common are (i) uniform, that is,
equal weight to each micro-state within the macro state, weighti(s ijPs i) = 1=(#s i in Ps i);
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(ii) invariant, that is, equal to the invariant long run equilibrium probability, conditional on
being in the macro-state, weighti(s ijPs i) = Pri(s ijPs i), and (iii) mass point where one of
the micro-states has probability one and all the remaining micro-states have probability zero.15
For the example reported in Table [1], using uniform weights we obtain
D̂T1 =
266664







































In particular cases invariant weights have been shown to give a better approximation. Van
Roy (2006) shows that the invariant weights reduce the error bound by a factor of 2= (1  )
for  close to 1 and Deng et al. (2011) formally prove the optimality of invariant weights
under the Kullback Leibler metric, for the case of simple irreducible and aperiodic Markov
Chains. However, the invariant disaggregation probabilities are di¢ cult to derive as they require
knowledge about the conditional probabilities originated from the invariant distribution, which
are equilibrium objects that we do not know. To obtain them, requires knowing the solution to
the dynamic game. One can still obtain approximate invariant disaggregation probabilities via
simulation but this is subject to the curse of dimensionality. We will discuss this below.
4.1 The transition matrix
We need to introduce some further notation. Let each rivalsstate s i(j) = (s 1; :::; s N) be
indexed along one single dimension j = f1; :::; KN 1g; and Qs be the transition matrix for
player i where a (k; j) entry
q(s0i; s
0
 i(j); si; s i(k); i; a);
is the probability that industry state (si; s0 i(j)) is reached from industry state s i(k) when a
player in state si chooses action a conditional on rivalsstrategy prole  i(s). A subscript s
indicates that the matrix is dened over the original set of rivalsstates. MatrixQs has dimension
KN by KN , which grows exponentially in N . The nal "aggregated" transition matrix becomes
QP = DQs
where a typical entry qP (s0P 0; s; P; i; a) is the probability that macro-state (s0; P 0) is reached
from macro-state (s; P ) when player i chooses action a and rivals adopt the vector of strategies
 i(s). We now explain how the aggregated matrix is obtained using a simple example.







for l = 1; 2
15This last one is the disaggregation matrix in the case of discretization methods (see below).
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where the aggregation matrix is the same at each possible own state of rm i, si = H;L.
That is why we have to "double" ̂l; one for each possible si = H;L. Note that both 1
and 2 form a basis as there are no linearly dependent columns. Adding linearly dependent
columns would be an ine¢ cient way to organize information. Using the aggregation matrix
we can construct the "aggregated" transition matrix Qs. A typical element of matrix Qs
is Pr(s0i; P
0




s i) is reached from the
micro-state (si; s i) when rivals use a given strategy prole  i and player i chooses action a.
As the original transition matrix (Qs) is of dimension KN by KN , the "aggregated" transition





0; si; LLL; i; a) be (s
0
i; si)-specic and denotes the probability
that rivalsstate s0 i is reached from state s i when players use a given strategy prole  i. The





i = L; si = L) Qs i(s
0
i = H; si = L)
Qs i(s
0
i = L; si = H) Qs i(s
0
i = H; si = H)
#






(LLL)0;(LLL) q(LLH)0;(LLL) ::: q(HHH)0;(LLL)
q
(LLL)0;(LLH) q(LLH)0;(LLH) ::: q(HHH)0;(LLH)
::: ::: ::: :::
q
(LLL)0;(HHH) q(LLH)0;(HHH) ::: q(HHH)0;(HHH)
377775 ;





i = L; si = L) Qs i1(s
0
i = H; si = L)
Qs i1(s
0
i = L; si = H) Qs i1(s
0
i = H; si = H)
#
;








(LLH)0;(LLL) + q(LHL)0;(LLL) + q(HLL)0;(LLL) ::: q
(HHH)0;(LLL)
q
(LLL)0;(LLH) q(LLH)0;(LLH) + q(LHL)0;(LLH) + q(HLL)0;(LLH) ::: q(HHH)0;(LLH)
::: ::: ::: :::
q
(LLL)0;(HHH) q(LLH)0;(HHH) + q(LHL)0;(HHH) + q(HLL)0;(HHH) ::: q(HHH)0;(HHH)
377775 :
Each sub-matrix illustrates where information is lost during aggregation. Take the cell in
row one, column two, which aggregates three continuation probabilities. If continuation values
are the same at each of these three probabilities, the aggregation will have no "loss" because
the sum of each probability times the continuation value equals the sum of the probabilities
times the continuation value (which is the same for each micro-state). The approximation will
deteriorate as the within-state variation increases, that is, as the range of continuation values of
the aggregated micro-states becomes wider.
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for l = 1; 2
and the disaggregation is the same at each possible own state of rm i, si = H;L.





i = L; si = L) D1Qs i1(s
0
i = H; si = L)
D1Qs i1(s
0
i = L; si = H) D1Qs i1(s
0
i = H; si = H)
#



























































Again, each sub-matrix at state (s0i; si) illustrates where information is "lost" during aggrega-
tion. Consider element in row two, column one. The aggregate transition probability frommacro-
state B to macro-state A (as dened in Table [1]) is

q
(LLL)0;(LLH) + q(LLL)0;(LHL) + q(LLL)0;(HLL)

=3.









where Pri(s ijP ) are the invariant distribution weights, that is, the equilibrium probability
conditional on being in the macro-state. In the symmetric and anonymous case, the equilibrium
conditional probability is uniform, Pr(HLLjB) = 1=3 and the uniform and invariant probabilities
are equivalent. However, in the general case the uniform and invariant probabilities will di¤er.
This suggests a preference for invariant weights, as it matches the true transition probabilities
exactly.
Rivalsstrategies The rivals follow the vector of strategies  i (si; s i) at each industry
state (si; s i). However, such strategies cannot be calculated if we solve the aggregated problem.
Instead, we obtain the approximated strategies in the set ~S  ~P . Let the vector with these
strategies be denoted Pi mapping the set of own and macro-states ~S  ~P to the set of possible
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actions ~A (Pi (s; P ) : ~S ~P ! ~A).16 Under the approximated strategies, the respective transition




 i; a) and the transition matrix is.
QP i;P = DQP i;s
where it is now made explicit the dependence between the transition matrix and the "approxi-
mated" rivalsstrategies. The fact that we cannot solve for the exact strategies in the approx-
imated problem will result in a second (second as compared to a single agent problem) source
of "error" due to the e¤ect on the rivals strategies (see the bounds in Theorem [5.1]). This
distinction is only relevant at equilibrium play.
Aggregation is not restricted to univariate own states. The aggregation rule denes how each
micro-state is assigned to a macro-state. This can be done for any number of own states. In
Appendix A.3 we provide an example with two states per player.
4.2 The Bellman operator
We now have all the elements to introduce the Bellman operator for both the original and
the approximated problems. This representation is very convenient since therse operators are
conditional on the strategies of the other players and are thus not the equilibrium objects. For




(T as; iV) where (T
a
s; iV) = s + QsV; 8 s; s i 2 ~S
N (5)
and s is the vector stacking all possible industry states (s; s i) for a given action a. Note
also that Qs is a and  i specic. For the approximated problem, let the Bellman operator
conditional on the strategies of the other players (P i) be
(TP;P iVP ) = maxa
(T aP;P i
VP ) where (T aP;P iVP ) = P + QP i;PVP ; 8 s; P 2
~S  ~P (6)
and P = Ds. The transition matrix, as dened above, is QP i;P = DQP i;s. Notice that
QP i;P is the matrix dened over the aggregated set of states (
~S ~P ) when rivalsstrategies are
also dened in the set ( ~S ~P ) whereas QP i;s is the matrix dened over the original set of states
( ~SN) when rivalsstrategies are dened over the set ( ~S  ~P ).
WriteV = VP where the aggregation matrix  "expands" the vectorVP in the aggregated








16We can scale the strategies back to the original domain using the disaggregation matrix, as we did for the
value function. If  is the vector of strategies at each possible state and similarly P is the vector of strategies
at each possible aggregated state, we obtain P = D. This simply sets the strategy at each macro-state
(s; P ) equal to an "average" of the strategies followed at each individual state (s; s i). If "similar" states are
aggregated, the strategies at each micro-state belonging to a given macro-state will also be "similar".
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In equilibrium, the optimal set of strategies are  for the original equilibria and P for the
approximated equilibria.
4.3 Implementation
To implement aggregation we can use the following step-by-step guide.
1. Dene the aggregation architecture,  and solve the period-payo¤ of the full game, s.
2. Specify the initial disaggregation matrix Dit. If invariant weights are not available, use
uniform weights at it = 0. These can be altered in step 5.
3. Specify some starting transition matrix Qit
P i;P
, e.g. the identity matrix. Note: Q i;s
cannot be obtained due to the curse of dimensionality.














 or its invariant distribu-
tion numerically. Use simulation. Start from industry congurations s 2 ~SN and simulate





. The disaggregation matrix (Dit) determines how to perform the simula-
tions. For example, with uniform weights, we let T = 2 and draw s uniformly from ~SN .




from this sample. The two
approaches work as follows:
a) Uniform: For each s (or sampling uniformly if KN is prohibitively large) use the
optimal policies from step 4. and construct ~q(s0i; s
0
 i; s; 
P ) via simulation. Aggregate by
summing over all industry states
~q(s0i; P




0; s; P )
where s0(l);(s0i;P 0)(r) is element (l; r) from matrix . Disaggregate by taking the average
across
~q(s0i; P






i; P i); s; 
P )
where ds(l);(si;P i)(r) is element (l; r) from (uniform) matrix D.
b) Invariant: Sample an element s from KN . Use the optimal policies from step 4.
and draw from q(s0; s; P ). Repeat this for T periods (for T ! 1) and obtain a series
(s1; s2; :::sT ). Drop the rst Tstart periods. Use the remaining T Tstart periods to calculate





and the invariant distribution.
6. Update P = Dits i with the according disaggregation matrix. No update needed with
uniform weights.
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7. Iterate on 4-6 until jjV it+1P (s; P )  V itP (s; P )jj1 < ', where ' is the tolerance level.
Step 5 calculates the transition matrix that lets us integrate over all the possible future
industry states and calculate the continuation value when players behave according to the pre-
scribed strategies j(s; P ) at each macro-node, P . While it is conceptually straightforward to
apply the aggregation and disaggregation matrices and obtain the transition analytically, this
is subject to the curse of dimensionality. Instead, we use simulations to compute the transition
matrix. Obviously this could run counter to the benets from aggregation. However, although
randomization is not successful for general nonlinear optimization, to deal with the curse of
dimensionality arising from numerical integration of the expected continuation value we can use
randomization, shown in Rust (1997) to break the curse of dimensionality of integration over
the future states.17.
Convergence The inner loop in Step 4, can be solved using value function iteration which
has guaranteed convergence. It is a well known fact that dynamic games are prone to have
multiple equilibria (e.g. Borkovsky, Doraszelski and Kryukov, 2010). Due to multiplicity, there
may be multiple xed points (multiple equilibria) which results in, not one, but a set of equi-
librium strategies. A proof of convergence is thus not possible for the outer loop that nds the
equilibrium strategies (xed point) without further assumptions that guarantee uniqueness (e.g.
concavity restrictions can guarantee a unique equilibrium).
4.4 Discretization vs. aggregation
The parallel between discretization and aggregation is known for MDPs (Markov decision processes
- see Gordon, 1999, page 114 or Van Roy, 2006, page 243). "Discretization is closely related
to state-aggregation; states are essentially partitioned into subsets, each of which is represented
by a point in a grid". Consider the case with one continuous state taking values in the unit
interval, s 2 [0; 1] . A possible discrete grid with 5 points is P 2 f0:1; 0:3; 0:5; 0:7; 0:9g. This
grid has an implicit aggregation rule. While there is an innity of possible aggregation rules let
it be uniform:
if s 2
[0; 0:2] P = 0:1
(0:2; 0:4] P = 0:3
(0:4; 0:6] P = 0:5
(0:6; 0:8] P = 0:7
(0:8; 1] P = 0:9
:
Discretization imposes two constraints on the (innite dimensional) aggregation matrix.
First, the macro-states have to be members of set of micro-states. This is not required for
general aggregation where the macro-states do not need to be members of the set of micro-
states. Second, the disaggregation operator is mass point: equal to one when the micro-state
17Formulating the game in continuous time (Doraszelsi and Judd, 2011) also breaks the curse of dimensionality
of integration.
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equals the macro-state and zero for all other micro-states. Some rows of matrix DT are vec-
tors of zeros, e.g., for any s 2 [0; 1]nf0:1g. This restriction simplies the problem as all other
micro-states can be ignored. Hybrid methods that use interpolation relax the hard aggregation
assumption on the aggregation matrix and allow micro-states to be recovered as a weighted
average of macro-states. For example V (0:2) = 1
2
(V (P = 0:1) + V (P = 0:3)).18
Aggregation combined with discretization can be applied to the cases with continuous states.
For example, the actual game is dened over the continuous state s and instead we use the
discrete grid P . There is an extra source of approximation error that emerges from using the
discrete approximation to the continuous case and occurs even if we could solve the game exactly
at the discrete grid states.19
5 Characterizing the aggregation: The bounds
We now use the framework outlined to characterize the error bound by decomposing it as a
function of the primitives. This characterization is useful as it explains why some approximations
work well while others do not. The error bound depends on the "di¤erence" in the primitives
of the aggregated micro-states, namely the prot and the transition functions. When identical
states are aggregated (as is the case with symmetric and anonymous industry states), the bound
is zero and the solution becomes exact. Furthermore, the matrix (I   D) plays a central role.
This matrix is a measure of within macro-state variability (see Equation [8] below). All proofs
of this section are contained in the Supplementary Material online appendix.
We rst establish two preliminary lemmas. The rst lemma is similar to Theorem 3.1 in
Whitt (1978) and establishes that an approximation is bounded above by the optimal greedy
strategy, with the optimal greedy strategy being a one-step application of the Bellman operator
to Equation [5].
Lemma 5.1 Let  and D be the aggregation and disaggregation matrices. Let Ts; i be the
Bellman operator in Equation [5] with solution V, let VP be the solution to approximated
problem in Equation [6] and V = V








The Bellman operator conditions on the competitors strategies. The di¤erence between
the two solutions is bounded by the one step greedy strategy of the full solution. The second
lemma "divides" this unilateral deviation to the optimal Bellman operator (T iV

   V ) into
its individual components.
18Interpolation is regularly used with discretization to improve the quality of the approximation in cases with
continuous states.
19Alternative methods to discretization can be used to approximate functions of continuous variables (see
Judd, 1998 for a review of these alternatives). As long as there is su¢ cient smoothness, computational tools to
solve continuous state problems are very di¤erent from the tools to solve discrete state problems. For example,
Doraszelski (2003) uses projection methods.
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Lemma 5.2 Let  and D be the aggregation and disaggregation matrices. Let s be the prot
function, Q i;s the transition matrix when competitors follow strategies,  i and QP i;s the
transition matrix when competitors follow strategies, P i. Let T i be the Bellman operator in
Equation [5] with optimal solution V, T a
P i
be the Bellman operator in Equation [6] with optimal




P . The one step unilateral deviation is
T iV

























The one step unilateral deviation to the full solution can be divided into three "gains": (i)
from the approximated (Ds) to the full prot (s); (ii) from the approximated (DQ i;s)
to the full transition (Q i;s) and; (iii) from the approximated (QP i;s) to the full optimal rivals
strategies (Q i;s). The last (fourth) term is the one step operator to the full solution and it
will be zero at the maximum, maxa T aP i
VP = V

P . With the two lemmas in hand, we can now
characterize the three components of the error bound).
Theorem 5.1 Let  and D be the aggregation and disaggregation matrices. Let s be the
prot function, Q i;s the transition matrix when competitors follow strategies,  i and QP i;s
the transition matrix when competitors follow strategies, P i. Let V
 be the optimal solution to




























The error bound does not impose any restrictions to the primitives. It is thus fairly general.
The result illustrates the three sources of approximation error: (i) the period returns ((I  
D)s), (ii) the transition matrix ((I   D)Q i;s), and (iii) the di¤erence in rivalsstrategies
(Q i;s QP i;s). The last term is specic to games and is not present in single agent problems.
20
There are cases where the bound is tight. If both primitives are perfectly aggregated (s =
Ds, and Q i;s = DQP i;s), the approximation is exact and the bound is tight (= 0). This
is the case when aggregated states are identical. Another case occurs when the law of motion is
independent from the actions of the players. In such case Q i;s = Qs = I is the same for all a




, and the bound holds with
equality. Finally, when  = 0, then V V = (I   D)s which again delivers a tight bound.
Section [A.4], reports numerical comparisons for this error bound.
20One important note that this last di¤erence holds for any set of rivals strategies, including the set of equi-
librium strategies. In games with multiple equilibria there is more than one such equilibrium strategies and thus
one bound for each of them. This last term only emerges because in solving the approximated game we obtain
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Theorem [5.1] illustrates the importance of within macro-state variation (I D) for optimal
aggregation. To minimize the rst two terms, optimal aggregation has to minimize within macro-
state variation (I  D). The next section discusses optimal aggregation. To do so, we have to
impose structure and restrict to monotone symmetric and anonymous Markov games.
6 Monotonicity and Order Preserving Aggregation
An aggregation architecture requires the choice of two elements: (i) the number of macro-
states/nodes (j ~P j) and (ii) the rule assigning each micro-state to one macro-state, that is, the
aggregation matrix (). We now restrict attention to symmetric and anonymous games where
the value function is a function of own state and the distribution of rivalsstates, VF (si;Fs i).
When the value function satises monotonicity, we show that for a given number of macro-
nodes, an optimal aggregation matrix () must be order preserving. That is, the rule assigning
micro-states to macro states should preserve monotonicity. Monotonicity is not a restrictive
condition since the equilibrium value function can always be sorted along any indexed set of
states. Nonetheless, characterizing monotonicity from primitive conditions is very useful to
guide the choice of the aggregation architecture and monotone games are part of a wide class of
games (see Amir (2010), Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990)).
This section starts with the denitions of monotonicity and order preserving aggregation.
It then shows that order preserving is a necessary condition of an optimal aggregation scheme
(Theorem [6.2]). Finally, su¢ cient conditions are discussed.
6.1 Denitions
Let ( ~F ;) be a partially ordered set where the order relation () is dened as follows.




k) 2 ~F , Fk  F 0k
for all k = 1; ::; K   1.
As F is a cumulative distribution, we can also say that F0 (weakly) rst order stochastically
dominates F:
Denition 4 (Monotonicity) Let two states F;F0 2 ~F . The value function is monotone in F
if for F  F0, VF (s;F)  VF (s;F0).
Assumption 1 The value function VF (s;F) is monotone in F.
Theorem 2 in Amir (2010) provides particular conditions under which the value function is
monotone. The result is an extension of the results on supermodular static games from Milgrom
and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990). The analysis is conducted in ordered topological spaces
(lattices) and restricts to games with non deterministic transition (Q) and prot () functions
that are monotone, supermodular and have increasing di¤erences (Assumptions R3 and T3).
This restriction excludes several games of interest. For example, the model in Besanko et al.
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(2010) violates the supermodularity condition.21 An alternative to checking the conditions on
the primitives is to directly check monotonicity for any particular value function.
Finally, the order is preserved under aggregation if micro-states maintain the same order
relation in the macro-state:
Denition 5 (Order Preserving Aggregation) Let ( ~F ;) and ( ~P ;) be two partially or-
dered sets. An aggregation scheme between partially ordered sets ( : V = VP ) is order
preserving if for any s i; s0 i such that F  F0 =) P  P 0.
6.2 Optimal Aggregation
The aggregation literature suggests aggregating micro-states that are similar. Two micro-states
are similar if they have a similar value (Rogers et al., 1991). Intuitively, when similar micro-
states are aggregated, the within macro-state variation is minimized. The same principle is used,
for example, in statistical cluster analysis. More formally, an optimal aggregation minimizes
the di¤erence between the exact and the approximate solutions. This error di¤erence can be
decomposed as follows
VF  V = D (VF  V) + (I   D)VF ; (7)
because V = VP . So the error can be divided into an average component (D (VF  V))
and a variation ((I   D)VF ). This di¤erence is bounded by a term on the second component,
when rivalsstrategies are xed. If rivals strategies are xed, the bound is a function of the value
function and the aggregation matrix.









1   jj (I   D)V

F jj:
Ideally we would like to minimize the error instead of the bound. There are cases where
the bound is sharp. If both primitives are perfectly aggregated (s = Ds and Q i;s =
DQP i;s), the approximation is exact and the bound is sharp ((I   D)V

F = 0). This is
the case when aggregated states are identical. Also, when  = 0 the bound is sharp because
VF V = (I   D)s = (I   D)VF . In general, however, the bound can be relatively loose.
For example, when the law of motion is independent from the actions of the players, Q i;s = Qs
is the same for all a and all  i. In such case DVF = V

 and the error becomes V

F  V =
(I   D)VF , so our error is 11  times larger than the true bound. For a usual  close to 1, this
21A more subtle example is an entry game with two quality types (high and low). The value of being a high type
monopolist is highest (say V=3). Having an extra low type competitors lowers my value (say V=2), while having
two low type competitors increases my value (say V=2.5) so the value function is non-monotone in the number
of low type competitors. This can be explained by a violation of increasing di¤erences in the transition function.
That is, with a low type competitor, there might be a high (transition) probability that second competitor enters
the market with a high type, leaving the incumbent worse than when facing two low type competitors. On the
other hand, having two low type competitors might keep the potential entrant outside, leaving the incumbent as
the sole high type competitor.
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constant term is considerably large. In Appendix [A.4], we study the relation between the error
and the bound. The results suggest that the error regularly holds with a constant smaller than
1
1  . In this case, we can use a tighter bound jjV

F   Vjj  f(;VF )jj (I   D)VF jj, where
f (:) is some scaling constant, in many cases one order of magnitude smaller than 1=(1  ).
Our bounds are in line with the literature on state aggregation. For example, Tsitsik-
lis and Van Roy (1996) establish that for single agent aggregation problem, jjVF   Vjj 
4
(1 )2 minV P2Rj
~P j jjVF   Vjj. The minimization term makes this bound smaller, whereas the
scaling constant makes this bound larger than the ones derived here. In Section [A.4] we provide
some computational comparisons which suggest that both the bounds derived in Theorem [5.1]
and Proposition [6.1] are overall smaller. This is because their bound is proportional to 4
(1 )2
although ours is proportional to 1
1  , and the proportional factor dominates for large . Van
Roy (2006) shows that if one uses the invariant distribution for constructing the disaggregation
matrix, the proportionality factor is reduced by a constant 2
(1 ) for  close to 1. Of course this
leads to a drastic improvement for large , similar to our bounds.
Using Proposition [6.1] and following the same approach as Bertsekas and Castanon (1989,
pp 591-592) we x the number of nodes/macro-states, jsjj ~P j and select the aggregation scheme,
, that minimizes22 the within-state variation
min
2f0;1gjsjj ~F jjsjj ~P j
k(I   D)VFk (8)
where for any vector v, (I   D)v is a vector of residuals orthogonal to . Let j be the jth
element of vector VF (or (s;F)(j)) and assume uniform weights. Each j element of (I D)VF
is
((I   D)VF )(j)























is aggregated into macro-state (s0i; P
0)(r) and zero otherwise.23 The previous expression shows
that choosing the aggregation matrix is equivalent to choosing an aggregation architecture that
minimizes the within macro-state variation. It is optimal to aggregate micro-states that have
similar value, V F . Thus, when the value function is monotone, any optimal aggregation must be
order preserving, which explains the following result.
22As explained in Deng et al. (2011) this optimization problem is itself subject to the curse of dimensionality.
This means that even if we knew V (which we dont), numerically nding the exact solution seems to be
computationally impossible. For the case where V is known, Jia (2011) derives an algorithm that nds the
optimal state aggregation in polynomial time of the size of the state space. We follow an alternative route to
numerical optimization, which is to establish necessary conditions on state aggregation.
23I   D = I   (T) 1T is the (idempotent) orthogonal projection matrix generated by the (full colum
rank) matrix .
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6.2.1 Necessary condition
Theorem 6.2 Let ( ~F ;) and ( ~P ;) be two partially ordered sets. Let the value function,
VF (s; F ) be monotone in F 2 ~F . The aggregation scheme between partially ordered sets ( :
V = VP ) is optimal only if it is order preserving.
Theorem [6.2] lets us restrict attention to order preserving aggregation schemes in monotone
games. The intuition is simple. An optimal architecture has to approximate well the short
run prots, and the transition matrix (Theorem [5.1]). Order preserving aggregation lumps
together micro-states that are "close" to each other, having a small within macro-state variation.
Although this condition is necessary, it is not su¢ cient, as there is typically more than one order
preserving aggregation architecture. For example, let there be ve ordered micro-states and two
macro-nodes. These can be aggregated as {1,2,3} and {4,5}, thus satisfying order preserving.
However, the fully optimal scheme could be {1,2} and {3,4,5}. Also order preserving.
Monotonicity is in general not a restrictive condition since we can always sort the vector VF
along any indexed set of states. However, given that we do not know VF , using the properties
of the primitives to obtain such monotonicity is important so that we can check if a proposed
aggregation is order preserving. Consider one particular, and intuitive, order preserving scheme
for monotone symmetric and anonymous games: quantiles. Let Sqs i be the qth quantile of the
rivalsdistribution




nk  q; 8q 2 [0; 1]g:
There is a continuum of quantiles (q 2 [0; 1]). For any nite set of R quantiles, the R-dimensional
quantile vector is










that takes values from the set ~P  ~SR. The dimensionality of the problem is unrelated with the
number of rms because the cardinality of set, ~P , solely depends on K and R. The size grows
with either R or K .24
Denition 6 (Quantile Aggregation) Let F 2 ~F be the cumulative distribution of s i. The
quantile aggregation is a matrix  : VF = VP ; and the macro-state, P , is the quantile of s i .
Ps i , is the R dimensional vector P : ~S
N 1 ! ~P as dened in equation [9].
A quantile aggregation scheme P is order preserving. To see this let us use a state denition
that is slightly di¤erent. Let  !s  i be the N 1-dimensional rivalsstate, s i, sorted from smallest
to largest. This is identical to F because for any two states s i and s0 i with Fs i = F
0
s i,
 !s  i =  !s 0 i. Now take two di¤erent states. If  !s  i   !s 0 i =) P !s  i  P !s 0 i. Note that, while
not necessary, in some cases the quantiles (macro-states) can be a subset of the rivals states
24We consider games with many rms, so that N   1 > K. If N   1 < K the approximation becomes exact
at R = K. However, in this case the approximation becomes exact at R = N   1 < K. See the discussion in
Section 3 of Pakes, Gowrisankaran and McGuire, 1993, in particular their footnote 4.
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(micro-states), ~P  ~F . Also, the quantile aggregation set can be identical to ~F , by choosing
N   1 equally spaced quantiles (no aggregation). This solves the problem exactly.
Example (quantiles) Let each player be in one of 3 possible states. Select the 50th and
the 100th percentile of the industry distribution. Now imagine that our industry has 40% of rms
in state 1, 30% are in state 2 and the remaining 30% are in state 3. The cumulative frequency is
(0:4; 0:7; 1) and, as usual, the last state (3) has a cumulative frequency of 1. We can have several
macro-states under the 50th and the 100th percentile. For example, (1; 2) means that 50% of the
rms are in state 1 (or below) and 100% of the rms are in state 2 (or below). We can also have
(1; 3) where the di¤erence is that we now know that 100% of the rms are in state 3 (or below).
Alternatively in state (2; 2) 50% of the rms are in state 2 (or below). To which macro-state
should we assign our industry distribution (0:4; 0:7; 1)? Well, 50% of the rms are in state 2 or
below (we have 40% in state 1 and 70% in state 2) while 100% of the rms are in state 3 or
below so that the macro-state to which we should assign (0:4; 0:7; 1) is macro-state (2; 3) where
50% of the rms are in state 2 (or below) and 100% of the rms are in state 3 (or below). If our
industry distribution was (0:2; 0:5; 1) it would be assigned to the same macro-state (2; 3), while
if it was (0:4; 1; 1) it would be assigned to macro-state (2; 2).
Multiple own states The notion of quantile cannot be directly extended to the case with
multiple states per rm. The reason is the lack of a natural order in multiple dimensions.
Following the same reasoning, instead of dening the rivals state with N   1 rivals, we can
dene it with R rivals, attributing a weight of N 1
R
to each rival. By this, we e¤ectively solve a
game with R rivals instead of N 1, each with a N 1
R
weight. This is the advantage of symmetry









values. For example, let the industry state







. There are two rms in state
(1,1), one rm in states (1,2), and (2,1) and two rms in state (2,2). The macro-state (with







where each rm in the
macro-state would get a weight of N 1
R









This R player aggregation is a particular case of quantiles when R are equally spaced quan-
tiles. It is less exible, for one reason. By imposing equal spacing, it may prevent separating
interesting market structures, such as the case of leading rms. Such restriction relates to the
su¢ ciency condition. Equally spaced quantiles is one of many aggregation architectures. While
non-equally spaced quantiles are likely to perform better, choosing such quantiles is a di¢ cult
(problem-specic) question that we now discuss.
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6.2.2 Su¢ cient Conditions
Su¢ cient conditions let us select the best out of all order preserving schemes. For example, any
quantile aggregation is order preserving, while there is an innity of quantiles to select from.
Drawing a parallel with other methods, in discretization we do not know which nodes are the
best points to select in a discrete grid, or in basis functions we do not know which basis to
select. Such choices depend on the shape of the value function, which is unknown. However,
information about the primitives of the model (e.g. shape restrictions) can be used to improve
the solution. For example, as we know s, the quantiles can be selected to capture relevant
industry features from the period returns by solving  = argmin2f0;1gjsjj ~F jjsjj ~P j k(I   D)sk.
This is the rst, and normally the most signicant, of the three sources of error in Theorem
[5.1]. When highly concentrated industry structures have a very strong (steep) e¤ect on prots,
top quantiles will capture rivalsstates with high concentration. This is the logic behind Ifrach
and Weintraubs (2016) use of dominant rms. The reason is intuitive, in the regions where the
value function is very steep we should aggregate fewer micro-states than in the regions where
the value function is at, thus minimizing the within macro-state variation. Again drawing a
parallel with discretization, it is best to select non-uniform grids with more nodes in areas where
the value function is steeper and less nodes in areas where the value function is atter.25
7 Empirical Illustration
To illustrate the applicability of the previous results we solve a dynamic reputation game for
the Hotel industry in the city of Porto, Portugal. Hotels compete to attract customers and ll
up rooms. Investing in customer satisfaction can help to build a visible reputation.
Reputation building has received increasing attention in online markets (for a review, see
Tadelis, 2016). Reputation is a persistent demand element captured here by online user hotel
ratings. User ratings can be divided into ow and stock. The ratings (ow) are the posted user
assessments in any given period of time. The ratings (stock), on the other hand, represents the
accumulated reviews over time. This distinction is important because the stock of user ratings
is an important strategic asset that hotels can exploit but takes time, and e¤ort to build. We
thus model ratings (stock) as a measure of accumulated past investments into quality, and the
ow as a measure of current investments into quality. This formulation is borrowed from the
standard capital accumulation/quality ladder models with reviews playing the role of investment
and ratingsstock playing the role of the stock of capital.
Accounting for persistence in strategic variables involves setting up a dynamic model of com-
petition with heterogeneous players (Ericson and Pakes, 1995). Since both prices and ratings are
perfectly observed by all the players, the perfect information MPE is a valid equilibrium concept.
Furthermore, the Markovian nature of hotel ratings (where rating stock today is a function of
25As an illustrative example take the following function, v = log(x). To approximate this function at some K
aggregate states xk 2 (0; 1] we should select states that are equidistant in v, not in x. For a concave function
this means selecting more states close zero where the function is very steep and less states close to one where the
function is less steep.
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the stock in the previous period and the ow of new reviews) make this a plausible dynamic
setting to adopt. In the hotel industry, the number of players can easily reach the hundreds,
meaning that standard dynamic models cannot be solved due to the curse of dimensionality.
To estimate the game I collected individual rating and review evaluations for all hotels from
online websites. Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics for the variables. A description of the
industry evolution, data collection, treatment and statistics is reported in the Appendix.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics.
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Rating (stock) 2005-2014 6403 3.0 1.4 1 5
Rating (ow) 2005-2014 3812 3.9 0.8 1 5
Notes: Summmary statistics for online ratings (stock and ow).
7.1 Parameterization
7.1.1 Static Demand
Several characteristics can inuence the utility a customer obtains from staying at a hotel,
such as its location, the number of stars, its price or its rating. The rst two are xed hotel
characteristics and we will instead focus on the remaining: price and ratings. Price is used to ll
up the hotel in any given month. Companies most commonly use BAR (Best Available Rate)
pricing with the objective to maximize short term (month) prots. There are ve possible rating
levels (K = 5): very low, low, medium, high and very high.
Let us abstract from time t for the moment. Consumer m = 1; :::M receives utility uim from
staying at hotel i
uim= s i pi+v im
where vim are extreme value independent and identically distributed preference shocks, pi 2
[0;1) is the hotel price and ;  2 [0;1) are the rating and price sensitivities, respectively.





n=1 exp(sn   pn)
(10)
where the market share, i, is a function of (si; s i; pi;p i). Marginal costs of production, c,







n=1 exp(sn   pn)
M (pi c);
26While prices can be used strategically and become a choice variable of the dynamic game, we will abstract
from this and assume static pricing. This is also in line with pricing policies used in the hotel industry, where the
most common is the BAR (best available rate) pricing. Prices are used to maximize expected short run monthly
prots.
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Letting the cost of investment, g, be a privately observed i.i.d. cost shock drawn from a distri-







To estimate the cost of investing in reputation building we have to calibrate the parameters
for the demand:  and . We borrow some parameters from Santos (2019). The price coe¢ cient
is set to  =  0:085. With 77 hotels this implies an average markup of about 12 euros per hotel
room/night (pi c =[(1 i)] 1 where i = 1=77). This markup is about 20% when compared
to the average room price of 60 euros reported in the industry (ahp-monitor.pt). The rating
coe¢ cient is set to  = 0:56. It implies that an increase of one unit in the rating generates a
56% increase in demand. A one standard deviation is 0.8 units (Table 3) which corresponds to
a 45% increase in demand.
7.1.2 Transitions
Individual ratings exhibit a very strong persistence, as illustrated by the transition matrix re-
ported in Table [4]. Firms can improve the rating by investing ait 2 [0; a] units and this way
inuencing customer reviews. Although the map from reviews to ratings is deterministic (yet po-
tentially unknown to the rm), the map from investment to reviews is stochastic, because rms
cannot control what their customers will post (see the online appendix A.1 for a more detailed
explanation). Companies expect investments to generate good on-line customer reviews.
Table 4: Transition matrix for individual ratings.
Rating at t
1 2 3 4 5
1 87 13 0 0 0
2 3 94 3 0 0
t-1 3 0 3 93 4 0
4 0 0 4 93 2
5 0 0 0 3 97
Number of Observations: 5842
We model the rating transition as a simple stochastic function of the investment. Let h 2
[0;1) be a parameter. The rating can increase to the next level with probability hait
1+hait
and
will stay the same with probability 1
1+hait
. If the hotel does not invest in customer satisfaction
(ait = 0), the rating will decrease with (exogenous) probability parameter  2 [0;1). The own
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Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimates for the transition parameters.
Coef. s.e. pval
 0.96 0.004 0.00
h 12.04 0.008 0.00
Obs. 3,226
Log-Lik. -1081.72
Note: Maximum Likelihood estimates.
state transition p(s0ijsi; ai) is thus




if y = s+ 1
(1 )+ha
1+ha
if y = s

1+ha
if y = s  1
: (12)
We use this transition probabilities to obtain a maximum likelihood estimator for  and h.
Table [5] reports the results. The probability of moving down one level if no investment is made
(a = 0) is estimated at ̂ =96%. On the other hand, the returns to investment are estimated to
be ĥ = 12:04. This number implies that at the mean investment, the probability of remaining in
the same own state is 91.9% (4.1% up and 4% down), whereas a one standard deviation increase
in investment increases this probability to 92.8% (4.2% up and 3% down), and a one standard
deviation decrease in investment decreases this probability to 89.8% (4.0% up and 6.1% down).
7.2 Estimator
We now introduce an estimator for the model. Solving the model even once is impossible due to
the curse of dimensionality (the size of the state space is 6:6 1053). The approximate solution
will be fundamental at breaking the curse of dimensionality so we are able to solve the game
numerically. Let us start by introducing the value for a rm in own state si and facing rivals
state s i is













35 dG(g); 8i; s; (13)
where M is the market size. The market share of hotel i (i) is a function of (si; s i) and solves
the system of equations [10] and [11].
The industry transition when rm i chooses action ai, and the competitors adopt strategies
 i is q(s0; s; ai; i). The full set of parameters in the problem are the price and rating sensitivity
( and , respectively), the transition parameters ( and h), the discount factor (), market size
(M) and our main parameter of interest, the cost parameter, g.
Data is at a monthly frequency and the discount factor is set to  = 0:98, per month. The
discount factor is normally not identied in dynamic models. A larger/smaller discount factor is
directly translated into a larger/smaller estimated cost, g. If the discount factor is larger (closer
to 1), it must be rationalized by larger costs, and vice-versa. Market size, M , is dened in terms
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of rooms in a given month (M = 428; 571). It equals the maximum number of people sleeping
in the northern region (750,000 in August 2014) divided by 1.75 that is the average number of
persons per room.27
To recover the cost function we use revealed preferences and nd the cost structure that ratio-
nalizes the observed decisions at the estimated static prots. We can write down a Least Square


















e(si;t   1; s i;t+1)
#
;
with ~q i;s i;si = Pr (s i;t+1jsi;t; s i;t; i) being the transition for the rivalsstate of competition
faced by rm i when rivals use strategy  i. The transition for si and s i are conditionally
independent given the transition structure formulated in Equation [12]. Assume for the moment
that rivals use equilibrium strategies,  i =  i. Combining with Equation [13], we obtain the



















V e(si;t   1; s i;t+1)
375 :
This equation has one very convenient analytical expression that allows us to solve it as a
function of a. Taking the logarithm we obtain





(1  ) (V e(si;t + 1; s i;t+1)  V e(si;t; s i;t+1))
+ (V e(si;t; s i;t+1)  V e(si;t   1; s i;t+1))
#35 (14)
 2 ln (1 + hai;t) :
If V e and  were known, all the elements on the right hand side of Equation [14] would
be known and we could recover the distribution of g, using for example a non-parametric kernel
density estimator. However, V e is not known and depends on the distribution of g. We will
assume ln g to be normally distributed28 with mean ln g and standard deviation ln g and use







(ln g)2it : (15)
Note that even though this is a least squares estimator, it is still computationally demanding
27In the section with computational comparisons, error and bound calculations, market size is scaled by the
number of rms M = 428; 571  N77
28We assume a parametric distribution because we have to take random draws from that distribution to solve
the game numerically.
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Note: Least sq. estimates.
because we do not know V e and . Both the transition and the value functions (~q i;s i;si and
V ) are unknown and vary with g. As such, we need to solve for the equilibrium of the game
in order to recover the two objects of interest by minimizing Equation [15] over ln g and ln g.29
The heavy computational part of the estimation is to solve the dynamic game for each candidate
solution (ln g; 2ln g).
The approximate solution is fundamental to let us solve the game numerically. For the case
with N = 77 hotels and K = 5 ratings levels, the total number of industry states (si;t; s i;t) is
577 = 6:6  1053. Under symmetry and anonymity the number of possible industry distributions
(si;t;Fs i;t) is 7:9  106, about 8 million states. Using 5 quantiles (16:6; 33:3; 50; 66:6; 83:3) the
size of (si;t;Ps i;t) is 630. Using the approximation we are able to solve the game in about 460
seconds.30
7.3 Results
The results are presented in Table [6]. Average cost parameter is estimated at g = 8; 289.
Combining with the review data ait, this number is equivalent to an average of 32,878 euros







t=1 ĝait = 32; 878). We can express this in euros per room-day by
considering an average of 30 days and 140 rooms. This average daily cost per room is about 7
euros and 82 cents, that is 14% of the average room price per day of 57 euros.
29Optimization of Equation [15] is not trivial. To nd the miminum to Equation [15] we start
with a candidate pair (ln g0; 0ln g), solve the game for this candidate parameter and update using












































ln g; 2ln g
s+1
is the new estimate,
 
ln g; 2ln g
s
is the old estimate, ait is the reviews
data and (si;t; s i;t) is the equilibrium solution predicted by the model at each industry state
(si;t; s i;t).
30Obtaining the transition matrix (kernel), requires the use of simulations. As such, the time spent can vary
as we increase or decrease the number of draws. The reported gure uses a total of 44 million draws. We should
emphasize that the absolute numbers depend on hardware, software, and code and should be interpreted with
this in mind. Section A.4 contains the precise details.
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8 Conclusion
In this article, I have developed an approximation method for dynamic games, based on state
aggregation. The main advantage is that the cardinality of the problem becomes unrelated
with the number of rms, letting us solve models with many players. I provide two main
theorems on the performance of approximate aggregation methods and a necessary condition for
any aggregate approximation method. I illustrate the methods applicability by building and
estimating a dynamic reputation game for the Hotel industry, where there are 77 players. I hope
the results open the venue for the application (and estimation) of dynamic games to a set of
situations where it was previously not possible.
There are two promising extensions that I have not considered. First, Van Roy (2006) shows
that using the invariant distribution allows us to establish a lower error bound for single agent
MDPs. It is possible that this result can be extended to games. Second, instead of dening
the aggregation matrix beforehand, Bertsekas and Castañon (1989) use an adaptive aggregation
algorithm that iteratively selects states to aggregate using the transition matrices. This is
expected to lead to an improvement in performance.
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A Online Appendix
A.1 Data Appendix
Industry evolution Following the entry of low cost airline carriers in 2009, average industry
ratings recovered from a steady decline (Figure [A1]). Both the number of hotels and their
quality (measured by ratings) have increased, as a result of the larger number of tourists in
town. Although it is easy to explain the increase in the number of hotels as a response to the
increase in the number of tourists, it is less clear why ratings have increased. To understand this,
notice that user ratings (both the ow and the stock) exhibit a skewed distribution - Figure [A2],
with a larger fraction of ratings at higher values (4 and 5). This fact has been documented in
previous studies, e.g. Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Liu, 2006. The observed changes in average
ratings are explained by the shifting distribution at the tails, as reported in Figure [A3].
Data Collection User generated content data is collected from Tripadvisor. This involves
collecting individual hotel information together with all the individual reviews. We obtain a
total of 20,388 reviews. The second source of data is aggregate (market level) stays at all hotels
in the northern region of Portugal obtained from http://www.turismodeportugal.pt/Português/
ProTurismo/estatísticas/ quadrosestatisticos/dormidas/Pages/Dormidas.aspx. We dene the
market to be the whole northern region for convenience because municipality (Porto) level data
is not available with a monthly frequency (only yearly). The city of Porto represents about 40%
of the total stays in the northern region (Pordata.pt).
Data description and treatment There is a total of 89 hotels in Porto. From the latitude
and longitude data we identify seven hotels that have either changed name and code or have
double entries on tripadvisor and merge them together. We also drop two hotels that located
outside of Porto (AS Hotel Agua Santas and Trajano) and three other hotels for which there
is no information besides the its name (Residencial Santo Antonio, Residencial S. Marcos and
Porto Center Hotel). We end up with a total of 77 hotels. Two hotels have no customer reviews,
that is, no rating (Morro do Sol, and HF Tuela Porto Ala Sul).
We do not observe investment directly. Instead, we observe the reviews as posted by each
individual customer. We model a directed relation from investment to reviews to ratings. To
obtain a measure of the investment a, we use the monthly average of these reviews that take
values on [1,5].
We can write ratings as a stochastic function of investment. In particular we use the following
parametric function
review =
5 exp(a+ )  3
exp(a+ ) + 1
where  2 [0;1) is a stochastic component. The choice of this parametric function is related
to the fact that investment a can take any non-negative value a 2 [0;1) whereas the reviews
38
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3521302
take values on the interval [1; 5]. This parametric function maps one into the other. Because
we would like to have a measure of investment dened on [0;1), we let ~a = a +  and use the
following transformation






This approach is similar to the innovation literature when only the output measures of
innovation are observed whereas the actual innovative e¤orts are unobserved.
Figure A1: User ratings: time series average for 2004-2014.
Figure A2: User ratings: Histogram for 2004-2014.
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Figure A3: User ratings: Evolution of distribution for 2004-2014.
A.2 Proofs
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma [5.1]
Proof. First note that
jjV  Vjj1 = jjTs; iV  Vjj1
= jjTs; iV   Ts; iV + T iV  Vjj1
= jjTs; iV  V + Ts; iV   Ts; iVjj1





where the rst inequality follows from the triangle inequality. The second inequality follows
from Ts; i being a contraction and jjTs; iV Ts; iVjj1  jjV Vjj1. This intermediate
result is similar to Theorem 3.1 in Whitt (1978).
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A.2.2 Proof of Lemma [5.2]





































































where in the rst step we use the Bellman operator dened in Equation 5,the second step is
obtained because V does not depend on a, the third step we just add and subtract Ds +
QP i;PV







P , the fth step adds and subtracts DQ i;sV

 and uses the denition
QP i;P = DQP i;s.
A.2.3 Proof of Theorem [5.1]
Proof. From Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2
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where in the second step we use the triangle inequality and in the third step we use the
Bellman operator dened in Equation 6 VP = TP iV

P .
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition[6.1]
We rst establish the following Lemma.




T and  i = 
P
 i , then
jjD (V  V) jj  jjV  Vjj
Proof.
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where the rst step follows from the reverse triangle inequality, the second step is just adding
and subtracting QP i ;sV
, the third step follows from Jensens inequality applied to a concave
operator, the fourth from DD = I, the fth from P i = 

 i . Finally notice that for any
vector v,
DQP i ;sv  jjvjj. This is because the left hand side term is a weighted average
of v, which under the supremum norm has to be  jjvjj. The only element that depends
on a is QP i ;s. It thus results that the left hand side term is still a weighted average of v
and
maxa nDQP i ;svo  jjvjj. As maxa nDQP i ;s (V  V)o  jjV   Vjj, this
inequality delivers the last result.
We can now prove Proposition [6.1].
jjV  Vjj = jjD (V  V) + (I   D)Vjj
 jjD (V  V) jj+ jj (I   D)Vjj
 1
1   jj (I   D)V
jj
Where the rst step follows from the triangle inequality and the second step from Lemma
[A.1]. The last step results from rearranging jjV Vjj   jjV Vjj  jj (I   D)Vjj.
A.2.5 Proof of Theorem [6.2]
Proof. We can prove this by contradiction. We propose an aggregation that does not satisfy
the condition, claim it to be optimal and show this cannot be true. Take three micro-states
F1  F2  F3 and two macro-states, P1  P2. By monotonicity as dened above and by
transitivity of the partially ordered set, VF (s;F1)  VF (s;F2)  VF (s;F3). Select a non-order
preserving aggregation, where P1;F1 = P1;F3  P2;F2, where for simplicity, Pn;Fm means that
micro-state Fm is aggregated in macro-state Pn. We now show that this cannot be optimal. The
following four inequalities hold by monotonicity of the value function
j1
2
(VF (s;F1)  VF (s;F3)j  j12(VF (s;F2)  VF (s;F3)j
j1
2
(VF (s;F1)  VF (s;F3)j  j12(VF (s;F3)  VF (s;F2)j
j1
2
(VF (s;F3)  VF (s;F1)j  j12(VF (s;F2)  VF (s;F3)j
j1
2
(VF (s;F3)  VF (s;F1)j  j12(VF (s;F3)  VF (s;F2)j
and by rearranging the elements
jVF (s;F1)  12(VF (s;F1) + VF (s;F3)j  jVF (s;F2) 
1
2
(VF (s;F2) + VF (s;F3)j
jVF (s;F1)  12(VF (s;F1) + VF (s;F3)j  jVF (s;F3) 
1
2
(VF (s;F2) + VF (s;F3)j
jVF (s;F3)  12(VF (s;F1) + VF (s;F3)j  jVF (s;F2) 
1
2
(VF (s;F2) + VF (s;F3)j
jVF (s;F3)  12(VF (s;F1) + VF (s;F3)j  jVF (s;F3) 
1
2
(VF (s;F2) + VF (s;F3)j




(VF (s;F1) + VF (s;F3)j; jVF (s;F3) 
1
2
(VF (s;F1) + VF (s;F3)j; 0)
 max(0; jVF (s;F2) 
1
2
(VF (s;F2) + VF (s;F3)j; jVF (s;F3) 
1
2
(VF (s;F2) + VF (s;F3)j)
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and the within-state variation from aggregating states F1 and F3 is larger or equal to the
within-state variation from aggregating states F2 and F3. Thus, the aggregation cannot be
optimal. The same holds if we selected the alternative non-order preserving aggregation P1;F2 
P2;F3 = P2;F1.
A.3 Multiple own states
As an example, let there be two own states s1 and s2 which can take two values f1; 2g. Imagine
the hotels considered the dynamic e¤ects of pricing on ratings. In this case the two states could
be the rating and the price of each hotel. Dene a set of macro nodes by dening elements of
the bivariate distribution, F(s1 i;s2 i). In this setting, with two rivals there are ten micro-states.





, has one rival in state (1,2) and one rival in





, the two rms are in state (1,1). So F is the cumulative count of
rms at each bivariate state. The micro-states can be aggregated into a specied set of macro























































The aggregation rule species: in the rst line the industry state with one rm in state (1,1)
and one rm in state (1,2) is aggregated with the industry states with one rm in state (1,2)
and one rm in state (2,2) and with the industry states with one rm in state (1,2) and one rm
in state (2,1) and they are all aggregated with the industry state with two rms in state (2,1).
The last line species that industry state with two rms in state (1,2) is left as a single node.
The aggregation assigns each of the 10 micro-states to the 4 macro-states. This is one of several
possible aggregation schemes.
A.4 Simulation Results - Performance
We now compare performance in speed and accuracy across di¤erent specications, concluding
with the calculation of the bounds. Absolute speed gures are always dependent on the hard-
ware, software and computational techniques used. In our case the results are obtained on a
3.2 Ghz 8-core desktop running Matlab. The code has been vectorized, and parallelized to use
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the eight cores. Whenever possible we also use sparse matrix manipulation for the aggregation
matrix. Given this, absolute numbers should vary with hardware, software and coding. We
instead focus on the relative gures.
A.4.1 Speed
Regarding speed, Table [A1] reports an increase in computational time with both the number of
players and the number of macro-nodes. The increase with the number of players is relatively
small when compared to a similar increase in the number of quantiles. Solving a game with
75 rms and 5 quantiles takes about 460 seconds whereas using 9 quantiles takes about 13,895
seconds. The run times are further decomposed into load times (solving the static pricing game,
constructing the aggregation and disaggregation matrices, and the prot vector), value function
iterations (solving the Bellman equation conditional on a given set of beliefs for the industry
transition), and the construction of the transition matrix. As reported, most time is spent in
constructing the transition matrix (simulations) - a total of 264 seconds out of 460 seconds
for the case with 75 rms and 5 quantiles. The time spent constructing the transition matrix
changes little as we vary the number of rms. Instead as we increase the number of rms the
load time (solving the static prot function, s) increases substantially. We further subdivide
the transition matrix time into the individual components, and nd that the random draws
are relatively negligible. The most time consuming procedure is to match the newly drawn
industry states to the index where they belong to - "nd" command in Matlab. Matlabs "nd"
command is a slow operation, taking about 93 seconds of the total 264 seconds spent constructing
the transition matrix.
A.4.2 Accuracy
Regarding accuracy, Tables [A2] and [A3] report the exact approximation errors (supnorm) up to
15 rms for the value and investment functions, respectively. It becomes almost prohibitive, in
terms of runtime, to solve the full model beyond 15 rms. Overall, the maximal errors are small,
in particular for investment (under 6%). Average errors are under 1%. A more detailed analysis
of Tables [A2] and [A3] gives us an understanding to how accuracy varies with the number of
players and the number of quantiles. For a given equilibrium value function (xed N), increasing
R cannot make the approximation worse. On the other hand, for a xed architecture size (xed
R) the game changes with changes to N and so does the equilibrium value function. It is unclear
how the quality of the approximation is expected to change as we increase N for xed R (N is
a parameter of the game, R is not). The results in Table [A2] are consistent with a decrease in
performance for xed R as N increases31. However, this decrease in performance is stronger for
small N than for large N; since the approximation improves as N increases for a xed N   R.
This is illustrated by reading the diagonals of Table [A2], over which the distance between exact
and approximate N  R remains xed. From this we extrapolate that there should be some N ,
31There are cases where N increases for a given R and the approximation improves. This could be due to
simulation error.
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Table A1: Computational time (in seconds) comparison across number of rms (N) and quantiles
(R).
N Load Val. Fun. Construction of the transition matrix Total
Total Draws Sort Match
R=5
10 0.28 3.67 144.11 0.70 1.02 104.68 157.83
15 0.61 3.45 142.97 0.58 1.49 100.37 147.49
20 1.04 3.79 147.35 0.59 2.10 98.72 152.48
25 1.96 4.15 160.11 0.60 2.59 98.04 166.69
50 35.50 4.49 250.97 0.60 7.92 93.84 291.28
75 189.73 4.30 264.83 0.56 18.59 93.15 459.31
R=7
10 0.40 30.27 1,062.97 1.47 2.69 946.20 1,096.18
15 0.79 28.14 1,033.90 1.35 3.98 915.79 1,064.84
20 1.22 30.78 1,020.12 1.54 5.49 887.41 1,054.45
25 2.62 25.40 1,066.64 1.39 6.72 890.67 1,097.57
50 44.18 33.83 1,821.42 1.35 20.40 824.34 1,902.03
75 228.81 33.29 1,902.58 1.37 50.32 843.52 2,168.87
R=9
10 0.57 252.03 5,576.22 3.00 5.81 5,319.27 5,844.67
15 0.95 248.31 5,638.43 3.02 9.18 5,144.18 5,915.06
20 1.63 245.68 5,521.16 3.07 12.43 5,004.03 5,789.87
25 3.47 236.92 5,569.65 2.97 15.07 4,904.89 5,838.77
50 59.83 251.13 7,763.94 2.88 42.34 4,342.80 8,098.42
75 302.06 253.02 13,312.74 2.96 132.80 4,795.89 13,895.16
Notes: This table reports how the run times are subdivided into the individual
components. The rst operation is load which consists of solving the static
pricing game and building the prot function and the aggregation and
disagregation matrices. The second component is obtaining the optimal value
function. The third operation is building the transition matrix (simulations).
This last operation can be further subdivided into the draws, sorting of the
industry vector and nding the index of industry state for each drawn state.
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Table A2: Maximal relative error in the value function between the exact and approximated
solutions, max((jV    V  j)=(jV j+ jV  j)).
R
N 4 5 6 7 8 9
6 3.30 0.00 - - - -
7 3.87 2.53 0.00 - - -
8 4.18 3.01 2.09 0.00 - -
9 4.70 3.25 2.91 1.76 0.00 -
10 4.43 3.80 2.83 2.09 1.55 0.00
11 5.33 3.95 3.28 2.31 1.97 1.35
12 5.98 3.72 3.44 2.66 2.04 1.61
13 5.84 4.52 3.68 3.11 2.44 1.80
14 6.77 4.92 3.58 3.13 2.52 2.05
15 6.43 5.07 3.97 3.12 2.63 2.29
Table A3: Maximal relative error in the investment function between the exact and approximated
solutions, max((ja   aj)=(jaj+ jaj)).
R
N 4 5 6 7 8 9
6 1.10 - - - - -
7 1.45 0.79 - - - -
8 2.25 1.33 0.85 - - -
9 2.50 2.00 1.25 0.71 - -
10 1.67 1.78 1.41 1.29 0.66 -
11 2.10 1.84 1.58 1.60 1.03 0.58
12 2.24 1.62 1.47 1.57 1.29 0.96
13 2.32 1.75 2.14 1.92 1.39 1.18
14 2.88 2.15 1.74 1.49 1.33 1.28
15 2.86 2.20 1.67 1.76 1.24 1.10
after which performance does not deteriorate, and can even improve.
The supnorm error can be misleading about the overall accuracy of the approximation as
it only considers the maximum error. Figure [A4] plots a scatter of the approximation errors
of the value and investment functions. Each dot represents an individual state, s i. Again the
two solutions are very close, in particular for the optimal investment levels. The correlation
between the approximate and exact solutions is 0.983 for R = 5. The gure also illustrates
the within-state variation. For each approximated value (macro-state), there is a set of dots of
true values (micro-states). Finally, Figure [A5] reports the steady state industry distribution.
The approximated solution slightly underestimates the number of rms with high ratings and
overestimates the number of rms with low ratings. This rationalizes the higher investment
levels in the approximated solution. Firms expect less competition in the long run.
A.4.3 Bounds
Our previous results show that the error is a function of the approximation architecture, namely
the within macro-state variance. Figure [A6] decomposes the error into its two components as
specied by Equation [7]: the mean, and the variance. The mean error is relatively constant
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Figure A4: Value and investment function for a rm i in state 1 (xi = 1) and 14 competitors -
scatter plot of exact vs approximate (5 and 7 quantiles) solutions. Log scale.
Figure A5: Long run steady state industry distribution - exact and approximated solutions
(N = 15; R = 5).
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across the di¤erent industry states, whereas the variance of the error is not. This illustrates our
theoretical results derived in Proposition [6.1]. Figure [A7] reports how the maximal error and its
two components (mean and variance) vary with the number of quantiles. The decrease in error
computed in Table [A2] is mostly explained by the decrease in the variance component. This
further corroborates the theoretical result, and illustrates how the variance component closely
matches the exact error.
Figure A6: Equation [7] error decomposition. Results with N=15 and R=5.
Figure A7: Maximal error (Equation [7] decomposition) with varying R (N=15).
Finally, Table [A4] provides a comparison across the di¤erent bounds: from Theorem [5.1],
from Proposition [6.1] and the bounds in Tsitsiklis and Van Roy (1996) and Van Roy (2006). The
bound obtained in Van Roy (2006) is only applicable when  is close to 1, under the invariant
distribution. The bounds from Theorem [5.1] and Proposition [6.1] are characterization bounds
that are only tight in particular cases and tend to be relatively loose when the discount factor
is close to 1. First, both the error and the bound become tighter when the discount factor is
smaller ( = 0:33). It seems that the bounds hold with a much smaller constant, suggesting
that the error is a linear transformation of the bound (columns 2 and 8 of Table [A4] about
40 to 50 times for  = 0:98 and about 1.5 to 1.54 times for  = 0:33). In terms of accuracy, the
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Table A4: Approximation error and bounds with varying degrees of approximation quality (R)
and discount factors ().
#R Error Decomposition Bounds
jjV    Vjj Variance Mean Error Theorem 5.1 Tsitsiklis Van Roy Proposition 6.1
jj(I   D)V jj jjD(V    V)jj and Van Roy valid at  = 1 jj(I D)V jj(1 )
 = 0:98
5 6,173,260 5,007,036 1,756,804 62,252,532 46,724,000,000 467,240,000 250,351,792
6 5,437,216 4,745,716 1,020,760 42,669,684 44,895,000,000 448,950,000 237,285,792
7 3,890,852 3,457,815 1,524,884 34,121,032 32,895,000,000 328,950,000 172,890,752
8 3,673,504 3,457,815 1,102,696 32,136,510 32,895,000,000 328,950,000 172,890,752
9 3,405,060 3,457,815 1,067,864 31,970,706 32,895,000,000 328,950,000 172,890,752
10 2,614,796 2,593,415 651,808 27,573,418 24,615,000,000 246,150,000 129,670,752
11 2,069,256 2,086,781 569,755 24,013,400 19,611,000,000 196,110,000 104,339,048
12 1,266,990 1,203,552 412,736 16,500,475 10,984,000,000 109,840,000 60,177,576
13 734,212 602,183 368,736 6,768,932 5,575,000,000 55,750,000 30,109,150
 = 0:33
5 82,573 84,507 3,187 86,543 222,020 74,377 126,130
6 82,548 84,507 2,650 86,517 222,020 74,377 126,130
7 57,691 59,322 1,987 62,679 153,500 51,423 88,541
8 57,663 59,322 2,043 62,636 153,500 51,423 88,541
9 57,990 59,322 2,096 63,002 152,640 51,134 88,541
10 40,620 41,776 1,748 45,606 106,180 35,570 62,352
11 29,648 30,218 1,474 34,183 76,507 25,630 45,102
12 14,567 14,824 921 18,603 38,779 12,991 22,126
13 6,480 6,553 525 8,966 19,260 6,452 9,781
Notes: Error and bounds at the estimated parameter values with N=15,  = 0:98 (top panel) and  = 0:33 (bottom panel).
The bound in Tsitsiklis and Van Roy (1996) is
4minVP
jjV  VP jj




bound from Theorem [5.1] is much tighter than the bound from Proposition [6.1]. Comparing
with the bounds derived in Tsitsiklis and Van Roy (1996) and Van Roy (2006), both of our
bounds are also much tighter, in particular when compared to Tsitsiklis and Van Roy (1996).
The bound obtained in Van Roy (2006) is smaller than the actual error when  = 0:33. This is
because it is only applicable when  approaches 1. Finally, the bounds are relatively accurate
when  = 0:33 (in particular the bound from Theorem [5.1]), which illustrates that the constant
1
1  plays an important role in making the bounds one or more orders of magnitude larger than
the true error.
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